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HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS IN FEDERAL AND TRIBAL
COURTS: A SEARCH FOR INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE
Carrie E. Garrow*
INTRODUCTION
Tribal courts are the most effective forum for addressing alleged civil rights vio-
lations under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA); thus, the provision in ICRA that
grants U.S. federal courts habeas corpus jurisdiction must be amended to allow tribal
governments to opt out. This is even more imperative because the 2013 Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA) amendments to ICRA provide non-Indians the option
to petition for a stay of detention while their habeas petition is pending. This new pro-
vision creates an ICRA that values the rights of non-Indians more than those of Indians
because Indians are not granted this option.
Although this new provision was created to avert fears that tribal courts are un-
able to properly address civil rights violations,1 an unprecedented survey of habeas
corpus petitions filed in federal courts under ICRA found that fifty percent of cases
are dismissed for failure to exhaust tribal court remedies. This acknowledges the sov-
ereignty of Indian Nations and the view that tribal courts are the most effective forum
for addressing any alleged violations. Notably, none of these cases were refiled after
exhausting their tribal remedies and, of the remaining cases that proceeded after ex-
hausting their tribal remedies, only four habeas petitions were granted. An additional
four writs were granted on jurisdictional grounds due to the defendants’ status as
non-Indians; however, the low number of writs granted since 1968 demonstrates that
tribal governments commit few civil rights violations that result in detention. Although
federal courts have exercised their supervisory duty as required by ICRA, it is no longer
necessary. Tribal courts effectively remedy any civil rights violations themselves.
The question remains, however, what happens when civil rights violations are
alleged in tribal courts? Although every tribal court is different, the case study of
* Professor Carrie E. Garrow is a Visiting Assistant Professor at Syracuse University
College of Law and the Chief Appellate Judge at the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Court. Professor
Garrow received her B.A. from Dartmouth College in 1991, her J.D. from Stanford Law
School in 1994, and her M.P.P. from the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government
in 2000. Many thanks to Jerry Gardner for pointing out the need for habeas corpus research
and to Matthew Fletcher for his comments and directing me to individualized justice. A
special thank you to my research assistants, Philip Bristol and Michelle Hollebeke, for their
tireless research.
1 See, e.g., Jodi Gillette & Charlie Galbraith, President Signs 2013 VAWA—Empowering
Tribes to Protect Native Women, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Mar. 7, 2013, 7:07 PM), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/03/07/president-signs-2013-VAWA-empowering-tribes
-protect-native-women [http://perma.cc/5U28-VBCE].
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Navajo Nation Supreme Court habeas corpus cases demonstrates that tribal courts,
when using tribal law based upon their culture, not only remedy civil rights viola-
tions but provide individualized justice by remedying such violations. Tribal courts,
therefore, act as a check on the power of both the executive branch and the lower
courts, reforming the justice system to avoid future civil rights violations. As illustrated
by Dean Haungooah’s case,2 tribal courts also work to restore a defendant to his or
her community.
In 2012, a Navajo Nation District Court sentenced Mr. Haungooah to 365 days
in jail and a $500 fine.3 The jail sentence was later suspended, and he was placed on
probation for a year.4 After three months of probation, a petition was filed that alleged
Haungooah violated probation by failing to be a law-abiding citizen, leaving the
jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation without approval, and possessing or using intoxi-
cating liquors or controlled substances without medical treatment.5 The petition also
stated that Haungooah failed to check in on July 9, 2012, but acknowledged that he
called on July 10, 2012, to inform his probation officer that he had left his residence
in Kayenta.6 “A copy of the revocation petition was provided to Probation and Parole
Services (PPS) to be mailed to [Haungooah] ‘when he disclose[d] his current address,’”
but the court never issued a summons to appear before it issued a bench warrant.7
Haungooah was then arrested on November 27, 2012, pursuant to the bench warrant.8
While he was detained, he was “served with a notice of hearing and criminal summons
ordering him to appear the very next day.”9 The court also issued an order of tem-
porary commitment without stating why Haungooah’s detention was necessary.10
At the hearing, the court informed Haungooah that his public defender had
withdrawn legal representation and that “any legal representation in th[e] proceeding
would be at his own cost.”11 Initially, the judge “asked [him] how he wished to proceed,
to which [he] did not respond.”12 The judge then asked Haungooah if he wanted to
proceed without an attorney, and Haungooah answered, “Yes.”13 Haungooah informed
the court that he was a non-member Indian whose family had moved out of Kayenta,
leaving him homeless.14 He explained that he had been “homeless for more than two
2 Haungooah v. Greyeyes, No. SC-CV-06-13, 2013 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 2 (Navajo
June 4, 2013).
3 Id. at *1–2.
4 Id. at *1.
5 Id. at *1–2.
6 Id. at *2.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at *3.
13 Id.
14 Id.
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weeks in Kayenta because PPS had told him he could not leave the area.”15 He stated
that when he did leave, it was difficult to find shelter but that he had told his proba-
tion office why he left.16 Haungooah also stated that he had remained in contact with
his probation officer by phone after he left Kayenta.17
The hearing proceeded with the judge simply “read[ing] the petition out loud
and, after each paragraph, . . . instruct[ing] [Haungooah] to answer ‘true or false,’ or
that he ‘understood.’”18 Haungooah stated “true” or “understood” each time.19 The
court found that Haungooah admitted to the allegations; thus, it reinstated the original
jail sentence of 365 days.20 After the imposition of the sentence, Haungooah filed
several motions with the court requesting credit for time served which were denied.21
He then filed a writ for habeas corpus with the Navajo Nation Supreme Court.22 In
an exercise of individualized justice, the Court granted Haungooah’s writ for vio-
lations of his due process rights,23 and then emphasized to the trial court and PPS that
“Diné justice ‘throws no one away.’”24
In 2013, I conducted a survey of habeas corpus petitions filed in federal court.
The survey occurred after the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act (VAWA)
was enacted, amending ICRA to recognize special criminal jurisdiction of tribal
governments over non-Indian defendants who committed domestic violence crimes.25
The amendments included a pilot project that enabled the Department of Justice to
select tribal governments to begin exercising the special criminal jurisdiction prior
to 2015.26 If an Indian Nation wanted to participate in the pilot project, it needed to
submit a lengthy application that described its justice system to the Department of
Justice.27 One of the questions was whether a habeas corpus petition had ever been
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at *3–4.
22 Id. at *4.
23 Id.
24 Id. at *7 & n.3 (quoting Accountability & Returning the Offender to the Community: Core
Responsibilities of Indian Justice, Memorandum from the Inter-Tribal Workgroup as Sub-
mitted by the Navajo Nation, the Hopi Tribe, and the Fort McDowell Yavapai Nation, and
Approved by the Intergovernmental Relations Comm. of the Navajo Council, Res. No. IGRMY-
109-08, to the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs on the proposed Indian Country Crime Bill
(Apr. 21, 2008), http://www.navajocourts.org/intertribalworkgroup/WorkgrpMemo1.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ZU9Q-GVAP]).
25 See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 § 204(b)(1), 25 U.S.C.A.
§ 1304(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-25 (excluding P.L. 114-18)).
26 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 908(b)(2)
(A)–(B), 127 Stat. 125 (West 2013).
27 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE RESERVATION ATTORNEY TULALIP TRIBES FINAL APPLICATION
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE VAWA PILOT PROJECT ON TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION (2013),
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filed in federal court by an individual detained by its tribal justice system.28 My
colleague, Jerry Gardner, who participated in the Department of Justice’s consulta-
tions regarding the implementation of the VAWA amendments, pointed out the lack
of research on how federal courts treat habeas petitions filed under ICRA, and he
suggested that I conduct this research. The results revealed that federal courts re-
spect tribal sovereignty. Although this confirmed that tribal courts are the appropri-
ate forum to remedy any civil rights violations, the next step needs to be taken. The
U.S. government needs to allow Indian Nations to opt out of federal habeas corpus
review granted by ICRA. This is not because tribal police, tribal prosecutors, and
tribal courts do not make mistakes, rather tribal courts, when using their own written
and oral tribal law,29 provide effective civil rights remedies. In doing so, they are
better able to provide individualized justice, treating each individual petitioner as
unique. Through the use of tribal law, the reviewing tribal court can reform the system
when needed to better reflect tribal values and protect civil rights. Federal courts,
however, cannot provide individualized justice because they do not understand the
individual’s rights as determined by tribal law and culture.
This Article is divided into the following sections. Part I provides a brief over-
view of the federal government’s restrictions on tribal courts and the Indian Civil
Rights Act (ICRA). Part II analyzes the purpose of habeas corpus. Part III presents
my unprecedented survey which examined the federal court habeas corpus petitions
filed under ICRA by individuals detained by tribal governments. Part IV proceeds
with a case study of habeas corpus petitions filed with the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court. The case study illustrates that the Navajo Nation Supreme Court not only rec-
tifies any civil rights violations using Navajo Common Law to interpret Navajo civil
rights and provide individualized justice, but also uses habeas petitions as a judicial
tool to both check the power of the executive branch and lower courts and improve
the system based on tribal culture that will result in fewer civil rights violations.
Wielding habeas corpus as a judicial tool, in addition to respecting it as a privilege
of the petitioners, the court provides individualized justice, which for the Navajo
Nation is Diné justice.30 Finally, I conclude that more federal review is not the an-
swer to ensure the protection of civil rights in tribal courts. The federal government
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tribal/legacy/2014/02/06/appl-questionnaire-tulalip
.pdf [http://perma.cc/6MKU-BENU].
28 See id. at no. 9.
29  Terms such as “tribal police,” “tribal prosecutors,” “tribal courts,” and “tribal law”
refer to the terms as used in the written and oral tribal law that is based upon the Nation’s
cultural values. Many Indian Nations have been saddled with laws based on western legal
values due to the colonial policies of the federal government, which interfered with the tribal
governments’ ability to function effectively. A part of the nation-building process that many
Indian Nations have gone through, and are still going through, is to rewrite their laws to restore
their own cultural values. See generally REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR
GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (Miriam Jorgensen ed., 2007); MELISSA L. TATUM ET AL.,
STRUCTURING SOVEREIGNTY: CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIVE NATIONS (2014).
30 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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needs to amend ICRA to allow Indian Nations to opt out of the habeas corpus pro-
vision, allowing more focus to be placed upon strengthening tribal courts to prevent
and address civil rights violations through the use of their own tribal laws, better
equipping them to provide individualized justice.
I. THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND FEDERAL INDIAN LAW’S
LIMITATIONS ON TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Tribal governments are separate sovereigns outside of and not subject to re-
strictions contained within the United States Constitution.31 In 1962, congressional
hearings focused on tribal governments’ administration of justice.32 Some members
of Congress expressed shock that Indian Nations were outside the reach of the
Constitution.33 Tribal members and leaders testified; some argued that tribal govern-
ments violated tribal members’ rights, while others testified that if violations existed,
they could be remedied at the tribal level.34 Opponents of federal civil rights legisla-
tion also argued that tribal laws often valued community rights over individual rights
and that any law enacted by the federal government would not only violate tribal
sovereignty, but also clash with tribal laws and culture.35
Despite these concerns, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)
in 1968, imposing limitations on tribal governments and creating a statutory basis
for civil rights.36 ICRA contained civil rights similar to those found in the U.S.
Constitution, such as the rights to due process and equal protection.37 Additionally,
ICRA limited the sentencing authority of tribal courts to six months and a $500
fine.38 Subsequent amendments, however, increased sentencing to one year and a
$15,000 fine, but the 2010 Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA) increased this limit
to three years.39 In addition to these limitations, ICRA created a federal remedy for
31 Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384–85 (1896); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Original
Understanding of the Political Status of Indian Tribes, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 153, 172–76
(2008). In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court stated, “As separate sovereigns pre-existing the
Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional
provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal . . . authority.” Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978); see COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
§ 14.03[1], at 916 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005) (“Indian tribes are not states of the
Union within the meaning of the Constitution, and the constitutional limitations on states thus
do not apply to tribes.”).
32 See STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 242 (4th ed. 2012).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1304 (2012).
37 See id. § 1302(a)(1)–(10) (enumerating many rights similar to those found in the U.S.
Constitution).
38 Id. § 1302(a)(7).
39 Id. § 1302(7)(C).
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civil rights violations that result in illegal detention. In part, ICRA provides that “[t]he
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a court of
the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe.”40
In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,41 the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed habeas
corpus as the only federal remedy that ICRA created.42 In recognizing tribal courts
as the appropriate forum for civil rights actions, the Court stated:
Tribal forums are available to vindicate rights created by the ICRA,
and § 1302 has the substantial and intended effect of changing
the law which these forums are obliged to apply. Tribal courts have
repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclu-
sive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and
property interests of both Indians and non-Indians.43
The Court acknowledged that tribal dispute resolution forums are positioned
better than federal courts to both understand and apply tribal traditions and customs.44
The Court also noted that “the structure of the statutory scheme and the legislative
history of Title I [of ICRA] suggest that Congress’s failure to provide remedies other
than habeas corpus was a deliberate one.”45 Thus, all other claims alleging civil
rights violations under ICRA, except for a habeas corpus petition challenging illegal
detention, must be brought in tribal court.
Despite the U.S. government’s current stated policy of supporting Indian self-
determination,46 numerous limitations on tribal court jurisdiction have been imposed
in addition to ICRA.47 In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,48 the U.S. Supreme
Court refused to recognize tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-members. The Court
later extended Oliphant in Duro v. Reina49 and refused to recognize tribal criminal
40 Id. § 1303.
41 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
42 Id. at 58–59. The Court recognized that tribes possess sovereign immunity, and only
the tribes or Congress could waive that immunity. Id.
43 Id. at 65 (citations omitted).
44 Id. at 71.
45 Id. at 61.
46 See Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000); Robert A. Williams,
Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing
the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219, 219–20 (1986) (providing
an overview of the origins of Indian jurisprudence in America); Robert B. Porter, A Proposal
to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal Indian Control Law, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
899, 899 (1998) (summarizing the evolution of federal Indian policy).
47 See, e.g., Jackie Gardina, Federal Preemption: A Roadmap for the Application of Tribal
Law in State Courts, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 11–13 (2010–2011) (noting limitations on tribal
courts’ jurisdiction).
48 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
49 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990).
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jurisdiction over non-member Indians. In 1991, after numerous requests by Indian
Nations, Congress adopted a Duro-fix by amending ICRA and restoring recognition
of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians.50
Recent events indicate a move toward further recognition of tribal court author-
ity,51 yet such recognition comes with limitations. Although the Tribal Law and Order
Act (TLOA) increased tribal court sentencing authority up to three years, it imposed
a nine year cap as total penalty or punishment in a criminal proceeding.52 This in-
creased sentencing authority also required tribal governments to model their courts’
practices after those of American courts. Pursuant to ICRA, tribal governments must
“provide to the defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel at least equal
to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution.”53 When charged with a crime
with a penalty of more than a year, the tribal government, at its expense, must provide
an indigent defendant an attorney that is “licensed to practice law by any jurisdiction
in the United States that applies appropriate professional licensing standards and ef-
fectively ensures the competence and professional responsibility of its licensed attor-
neys.”54 Prior to charging a defendant, the laws must be publicly available, and a
recording must be made of the trial.55 Finally, the judge presiding over the proceeding
must have sufficient legal training and be licensed by any jurisdiction.56
In 2013, Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act
(VAWA) , amending ICRA to restore the recognition of Indian Nations’s criminal juris-
diction of tribal courts over non-Indian defendants charged with domestic violence.57
The non-Indian defendant must have a tie to the Nation by residing or working within
such Nation’s Indian country, or be a spouse, intimate partner or dating partner of a
member of such Nation or an Indian who resides within such Nation’s Indian coun-
try.58 This recognition of special criminal jurisdiction also comes with limitations.
50 Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2012).
51 See, e.g., id. § 1302(a)(7)(D).
52 Id.
53 Id. § 1302(c)(1).
54 Id. § 1302(c)(2).
55 Id. § 1302(c)(4)–(5).
56 Id. § 1302(c)(3).
57 Id. § 1304(b). The purpose of VAWA is to combat the high rates of domestic violence
and sexual abuse that result from the lack of resources, the lack of tribal criminal jurisdiction
over non-member Indians, and a confusing maze of Congressional legislation that has granted
federal courts and some state courts concurrent jurisdiction. See AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF
INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE
USA 19 (2007), http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/MazeOfInjustice.pdf [http://perma.cc
/CQR9-XC6K]. The bill to reauthorize VAWA initially met strong opposition due to the
jurisdictional provisions’ granting Indian Nations limited criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians. See, e.g., Rebecca Burns, VAWA: A Victory for Women—But Which Women?, IN THESE
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2013), http://inthesetimes.com/article/14668/vawa_a_victory_for_womenbut
_which_women [http://perma.cc/NK2C-ZRBH] (interviewing author Beth Richie).
58 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B).
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Important for this discussion is that when a non-Indian defendant files a habeas corpus
writ, he may also request a stay of detention.59 The federal court may grant a stay of
detention if there is a likelihood the petition will be granted and, “after giving [the]
alleged victim . . . an opportunity to be heard, [the court] finds by clear and convincing
evidence . . . the petitioner is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any person or the
community if released.”60 Also, all of the TLOA sentencing provisions apply to non-
Indian defendants, regardless of whether they are charged with a crime that has a
sentence longer than one year.61 Additionally, the panel from which a jury is se-
lected must “reflect a fair cross section of the community,”62 in order to allay fears
that a non-Indian defendant would be tried by a jury consisting of all Indians. Finally,
the Nation exercising criminal jurisdiction must provide “all other rights whose pro-
tection is necessary under the Constitution of the United States in order for Congress
to recognize and affirm the inherent power of the participating tribe to exercise special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over the defendant.”63
Other limitations on tribal courts may lay in the future. In November 2013, the
Indian Law and Order Commission (ILOC), created by TLOA, issued its recommen-
dations on improving law and order in Indian country.64 One of the many recom-
mendations made was to allow Indian Nations to opt out of “Federal Indian country
criminal jurisdiction and/or congressionally authorized State jurisdiction, except for
Federal laws of general application.”65 Upon opting out, the Nation would have “in-
herent criminal jurisdiction over all persons within . . . the Tribe’s lands as defined
in the Federal Indian Country Act.”66 Although tribal governments oppressed by the
current jurisdictional maze welcomed this recommendation, such recommendation
came with limitations. For instance, if a Nation chose to exercise criminal jurisdic-
tion, its “Tribal government must also immediately afford all individuals charged
with a crime with civil rights protections equivalent to those guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution.”67 Additionally, the government would be subject to full Federal judicial
appellate review by a newly created United States Court of Indian Appeals with the
power to hear appeals of
alleged violations of the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 8th Amendments of
the U.S. Constitution by Tribal courts; to interpret Federal law
59 Id. § 1304(e)(1).
60 Id. § 1304(e)(1)–(2).
61 Id. § 1304(d).
62 Id. § 1304(d)(3)(A).
63 Id. § 1304(d)(4).
64 See generally INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE
AMERICA SAFER: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT & CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (2013),
http://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/files/A_Roadmap_For_Making_Native_America_Safer
-Full.pdf [http://perma.cc/XF94-XMSR].
65 Id. at 23.
66 Id. at ix (citations omitted).
67 Id. at 23.
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related to criminal cases arising in Indian country throughout the
United States; to hear and resolve Federal questions involving
the jurisdiction of Tribal courts; and to address Federal habeas
corpus petitions.68
The Commission made this recommendation for a new layer of federal court
review despite stating that “[t]here is little or no scholarly research or other evidence
showing significant violations of ICRA by Tribal courts that go uncorrected by Tribal
appellate courts; in fact, what research exists, although limited, suggests that there
is no systematic problem of under-protection.”69 My research demonstrates that the
current federal review granted under ICRA and any additional form of federal review
suggested by the ILOC is no longer necessary.
II. HABEAS CORPUS
The U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it.”70 ICRA follows suit, incorporating the privilege language:
“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a
court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian
tribe.”71 The U.S. Supreme Court stated that this privilege serves to protect a person’s
liberty, and the “protection for the habeas privilege was one of the few safeguards
of liberty specified in a Constitution that, at the outset, had no Bill of Rights . . . .”72
Scholars argue that habeas review is also a form of Article III power belonging
to judges.73 In English common law, habeas corpus
originated, after all, not as a protection for the individual, but as
a procedure for the judiciary to issue a command to the executive
in the person of the sheriff. As habeas corpus evolved into a pro-
cess to examine the basis of a person’s detention, the real target
of the writ was not the detainee, but the government officer
called on to justify the basis of his or her authority to detain.74
68 Id. at 23–24.
69 Id. at 19 (citing THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY (Kristen A. Carpenter et al.
eds., 2012)).
70 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
71 Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012).
72 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 725 (2008).
73 See Lee Kovarsky, A Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power, 99 VA. L. REV. 753,
774–75 (2013); Steven Semeraro, Two Theories of Habeas Corpus, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1233,
1249 (2006).
74 See Brian R. Farrell, Habeas Corpus in Times of Emergency: A Historical and Compara-
tive View, 1 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION 74, 92 (2010), http://digitalcommons
.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1011&context=pilronline [http://perma.cc/YK5U-XVQZ].
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The writ “serve[d] as a barometer for the existence of respect for the rule of law and,
by extension, the legitimacy of a government’s authority.”75 English judges used the
writ to consolidate power and to decide what counted as lawful custody, as habeas was
an “instrument of English judicial power,” which “allowed judges—not legislators or
monarchs—to determine how much custodial process rendered detention lawful.”76
The scope of a court’s review of a habeas petition varies depending on several fac-
tors, including where in the judicial process the writ is filed and the nature of the court
ordering detention. The reviewing court tailors its review depending “upon the rigor
of any earlier proceedings.”77 In Boumediene, the Court noted that “the common-law
habeas court’s role was most extensive in cases of pretrial and noncriminal deten-
tion, where [the petitioner had] little or no previous judicial review of the cause for
detention.”78 A court of record, possessing general jurisdiction, receives less scrutiny
than “‘inferior’ tribunals of limited jurisdiction,” because courts of record have broad
remedial powers that give “the habeas court greater confidence in the judgment’s
validity.”79 The U.S. Supreme Court noted:
Accordingly, where relief is sought from a sentence that resulted
from the judgment of a court of record, as was the case in Watkins
and indeed in most federal habeas cases, considerable deference
is owed to the court that ordered confinement. . . . Likewise in
those cases the prisoner should exhaust adequate alternative rem-
edies before filing for the writ in federal court. . . . Both aspects
of federal habeas corpus review are justified because it can be
assumed that, in the usual course, a court of record provides de-
fendants with a fair, adversary proceeding.80
Habeas review allows for a review of the factual and legal support for detention
in addition to providing a chance to determine whether the proceedings provided due
process: “First, judges provide habeas process when reviewing whether a detention is
authorized, which includes examining whether the detention has adequate factual
and legal support. Second, in doing so, the judge may examine whether earlier pro-
ceedings comported with due process.”81 As discussed above, however, when there
are minimal proceedings in the originating court, “habeas takes on a greater role where
due process is constrained. Judges have the strongest Suspension Clause obligation
75 Id.
76 Kovarsky, supra note 73, at 759 (citations omitted).
77 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 781.
78 Id. at 780.
79 Id. at 782.
80 Id. (citations omitted).
81 See Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 47,
55 (2012).
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to review legal and factual questions where there was no prior adequate judicial re-
view of detention.”82
Tribal courts also use habeas corpus as an instrument of judicial power. As dem-
onstrated below, the Navajo Supreme Court uses it to determine whether the appro-
priate custodial process was in place to protect the rights of defendants.83 The Navajo
Supreme Court also uses the writ as a check on whether the proceedings provided
due process and whether detention is authorized.84 Although Congress may have in-
tended ICRA’s habeas provision as a check on the power of Indian Nations, federal
courts—in acknowledgment of tribal sovereignty—consistently defer to the tribal court
that ordered the confinement and require exhaustion of tribal remedies in most cases.85
III. FEDERAL COURTS AND ICRA HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS
My methodology is focused on habeas petitions filed under ICRA in federal court
since ICRA’s enactment in 1968. The survey discovered a total of only thirty cases.
Habeas corpus petitions that were filed but subsequently found by the court to not
include detention,86 a criminal violation,87 or later ruled as moot88 were screened out.
82 Id. at 56.
83 See, e.g., Tiger v. Moore, No. CIV-11-73-FHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21355 (E.D.
Okla. Mar. 3, 2011).
84 See, e.g., Jeffredo v. Macarro, 590 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 925
(2010).
85 See infra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
86 For example, in Jeffredo, 590 F.3d at 751, appellants filed a habeas corpus action claiming
their tribe disenrollment was equal to detention. The court held the limitation on their access
to tribal facilities did not rise to a detention, and thus the court did not have habeas jurisdiction.
Id. In Shenandoah v. Halbritter, 366 F.3d 89, 90–92 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S.
974 (2005), the petitioners sought habeas relief for an allegedly unlawful tribal housing
ordinance. The court held that the housing ordinance did not constitute a sufficiently severe
restraint on their liberty to invoke the court’s habeas corpus jurisdiction. Id. In Barnett v.
Moore, No. CIV-11-74-FHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21451 (E.D. Okla. Mar. 3, 2011), once
again, the petitioners sought a writ seeking relief from tribal court order holding them in
indirect contempt and imposing a financial sanction. The court again held the petitioners
failed to satisfy the custody requirement of habeas corpus relief. Id. In Tiger, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21355, the petitioners sought a writ seeking relief from tribal court order holding them
in indirect contempt and imposing a financial sanction. The court held the petitioners failed
to satisfy the custody requirement of habeas corpus relief. Id. In Payer v. Turtle Mountain
Tribal Council, No. A4-03-105, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18173, at *2, *16 (D.N.D. Oct. 1, 2003),
petitioners sought relief from a tribal council resolution removing them as school board
members. The court ruled that they were not detained and their claims were more appropriately
characterized as a property right and thus the court lacked habeas corpus jurisdiction. Id.
87 See, e.g., Alire v. Jackson, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1125, 1127 (D. Or. 1999). The
petitioner sought habeas corpus relief for an order excluding her from her Indian reservation.
The court held that this was a civil proceeding and not a criminal conviction, thus habeas
corpus remedy under the Indian Civil Rights Act was not available. Id.
88 See, e.g., Romero v. Goodrich, No. 11-2159, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9508, at *2–3
(10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1315 (2013). After an unsuccessful tribal appeal,
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Also, cases where a determination on the writ could not be found were also excluded.
These cases were all screened out, because they could not provide a complete picture
of federal habeas corpus review under ICRA.
The survey revealed that federal courts, when the detainee is an Indian, are re-
spectful of tribal government sovereignty and jurisdiction and defer to tribal courts
by requiring exhaustion of tribal remedies. Fourteen of the thirty cases were dismissed
for failure to exhaust tribal court remedies.89 None of these cases reappeared in the
federal courts.90 Courts generally allowed several exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement, and only five of these cases were found. The most common exception was
the non-Indian status of the petitioner, over which the tribal court lacked jurisdiction
according to Oliphant.91 Since Oliphant, it has been rare for a tribal government to
detain a non-Indian; thus, it is not surprising that the number is low. In the remain-
ing ten cases, the petitioners had exhausted their tribal court remedies and proceeded
forward with their federal habeas petitions. Six of these writs were denied, and four
were granted. The low number of cases filed over a forty-five-year span, and the grant-
ing of only four writs does not support Congress’s concern that tribal governments
committed numerous civil rights violations.
A. The Exhaustion Requirement
Federal courts “generally recognize[ ] that a petitioner must fully exhaust tribal-
court remedies before a federal court can review challenges to his detention.”92 This
the defendant filed a habeas petition alleging an excessive sentence. The district court magis-
trate recommended his petition be granted. He was subsequently indicted by a federal court
for assaulting a federal officer during his stay in a tribal jail. The tribal court, after learning
of the new charge and lengthy sentence he might face, sua sponte commuted defendant’s
sentence. The court then dismissed the defendant’s habeas petition as moot. Id.
89 See Valenzuela v. Silversmith, 699 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2012); Selam v. Warm Springs
Tribal Corr. Facility, 134 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1998); Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823 (9th Cir.
1995); Youckton v. Stinson, No. C10-5780BHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12122 (W.D. Wash.
Feb. 8, 2011); Anderson v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians Tribal Court,
No. 1:10-CV-676, 2010 WL 5625054 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 21, 2010); Chipps v. Oglala Sioux
Tribal Court, No. CIV. 10-5028-JLV, 2010 WL 1999458 (D.S.D. May 18, 2010); Acosta-Vigil
v. Delorme-Gaines, 672 F. Supp. 2d 1194 (D.N.M. 2009); Bercier v. Turtle Mountain Tribal
Court, No. 4:08-cv-094, 2009 WL 113606 (D.N.D. Jan. 15, 2009); Azure v. Turtle Mountain
Tribal Court, No. 4:08-cv-095, 2009 WL 113597 (D.N.D. Jan. 15, 2009); McPhee v. Steckel,
No. C07-5668RJB, 2008 WL 410650 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 12, 2008); Whitetail v. Spirit Lake
Tribal Court, No. 2:07-cv-42, 2007 WL 4233490 (D.N.D. Nov. 28, 2007); LaVallie v. Turtle
Mountain Tribal Court, No. 4-06-CV-9, 2006 WL 1069704 (D.N.D. Apr. 18, 2006); Donnell
v. Red Lake Tribe, No. Civ. 04-5086JNEJGL, 2005 WL 2250767 (D. Minn. Sept. 13, 2005);
Gillette v. Marcellais, No. A4-04-123, 2004 WL 2677268 (D.N.D. Nov. 22, 2004).
90 See supra note 89 for the lack of subsequent case history.
91 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211–12 (1978), superseded by
25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1979).
92 Acosta-Vigil, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 1196 (citing Boozer v. Wilder, 381 F.3d 931, 935 (9th
Cir. 2004)); see also Azure–Lone Fight v. Cain, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1150 (D.N.D. 2004);
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exhaustion rule, however, is not required by ICRA, but it is based upon comity and
is generally not a jurisdictional prerequisite to review.93 This is in accordance with
the general application of the privilege of habeas, as deference is given to courts of
record which provide defendants with a fair hearing and subsequently impose a sen-
tence.94 Exhaustion of tribal court remedies is required as ICRA was designed “to
limit tribal government and it is therefore appropriate that tribal courts interpret their
application to tribal proceedings.”95
Courts provide several reasons for the exhaustion rule. The rule reinforces Con-
gress’s policy of “promoting tribal sovereignty, including the development of tribal
courts.”96 It also promotes the administration of justice “by allowing a full record to
be developed in the [t]ribal [c]ourt before either the merits or any question concern-
ing appropriate relief is addressed [in federal court].”97 This is in accord with judicial
reasoning in non-ICRA habeas cases, requiring exhaustion to create a sufficient
record for the reviewing court.98 Perhaps most importantly, the exhaustion rule gives
a tribal court “full opportunity . . . to rectify any errors it may have made.”99
The courts do not always require petitioners to exhaust tribal remedies.100 The
court will “make [an] inquiry to see what the law demands under the circumstances.
The need to adjudicate alleged deprivations of individual rights must be balanced
against the need to preserve the cultural identity of the tribe by strengthening the
tribe’s own institutions.”101 The court may not require exhaustion “where an asser-
tion of tribal jurisdiction ‘is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad
faith,’ or where the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions,
or where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity
to challenge the court’s jurisdiction.”102 Also, a court will generally not require a peti-
tioner to exhaust tribal remedies
if he or she proves that resort to remedies provided by the tribe
would be futile. If a tribal remedy in theory is non-existent in
Quair v. Sisco, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 971–72 (E.D. Cal. 2004); Lyda v. Tah-Bone, 962 F.
Supp. 1434, 1436 (D. Utah 1997).
93 See Valenzuela, 699 F.3d at 1206; Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1168 (10th Cir.
2006); Necklace v. Tribal Court of Three Affiliated Tribes, 554 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1977).
94 See supra Part II.
95 Acosta-Vigil, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 1196.
96 Valenzuela, 699 F.3d at 1206 (citing Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985)).
97 Id. (quoting Nat’l Farmers Union Ins., 471 U.S. at 856).
98 See supra Part II.
99 Valenzuela, 699 F.3d at 1206 (quoting Nat’l Farmers Union Ins., 471 U.S. at 856).
100 See, e.g., Wounded Knee v. Andera, 416 F. Supp. 1236, 1239 (D.S.D. 1976).
101 Id.
102 LaVallie v. Turtle Mountain Tribal Court, No. 4-06-CV-9, 2006 WL 1069704, at *2
(D.N.D. Apr. 18, 2006) (quoting Nat’l Farmers Union Ins., 471 U.S. at 857 n.21).
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fact or at best inadequate, it might not need to be exhausted. If
a Petitioner does all that is possible but an attempted appeal is frus-
trated by official inaction, no more can be demanded, and the ex-
haustion requirement is satisfied.103
As noted above, exhaustion of lower court remedies is preferred by appellate
courts.104 Exhaustion of remedies is also required for habeas corpus petitioners who
seek a writ in federal court while detained by state governments.105 The exhaustion rule
for state-detained petitioners is not based on comity, rather it is required by statute.106
The application for habeas corpus “shall not be granted unless it appears that the
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.”107 The ex-
ceptions to this statutory requirement are an absence of an available corrective
process in the state or “circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the applicant.”108 Fortunately, despite the lack of a statutory re-
quirement in ICRA, federal courts recognize tribal sovereignty and that the sentencing
court should be allowed to remedy any violation, as the sentencing court has broader
remedial powers and a knowledge of tribal law.
B. Non-Indian Defendants—No Exhaustion Required
My survey found only five cases where the federal courts did not require exhaus-
tion of tribal remedies. Four of these were non-Indians, illustrating that the federal
courts’ deferral to tribal courts is citizenship based. In Oliphant, the defendant was
a non-Indian, and tribal court proceedings were stayed after his arraignment on a
charge of assaulting a tribal police officer while he proceeded to argue lack of juris-
diction through his habeas petition in federal court.109 In Duro, the defendant, a non-
member Indian, was charged with illegally firing a weapon.110 After the tribal court
denied his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, he filed a writ of habeas corpus
in federal court.111 In Oliphant and Duro, the Supreme Court failed to address the
103 Wounded Knee, 416 F. Supp. at 1239 (citations omitted); see also Selam v. Warm Springs
Tribal Corr. Facility, 134 F.3d 948, 954 (9th Cir. 1998); St. Marks v. Chippewa-Cree Tribe, 545
F.2d 1188, 1189–90 (9th Cir. 1976); Cobell v. Cobell, 503 F.2d 790, 793–94 (9th Cir. 1974).
104 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
105 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1)(A) (2012).
106 See id. § 2254.
107 Id. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
108 Id. § 2254(b)(1)(B).
109 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194–95 (1978), superceded by 25
U.S.C. § 1301 (1979). Oliphant, a non-Indian who was a resident of the Reservation, filed
his writ after his arraignment and was released on his own recognizance. Id. at 194.
110 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 676 (1990), superceded by 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1990).
111 Id. Duro allegedly shot and killed a fourteen-year-old boy on the Salt River Reserva-
tion. He was charged with murder by the federal government pursuant to the Major Crimes
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exhaustion of tribal remedies rule, proceeding directly to the question of the tribal
court’s jurisdiction.112 Federal courts follow this procedure and do not require ex-
haustion of tribal court remedies when the petitioner is a non-Indian.113 In Wetsit, for
instance, the Ninth Circuit stated:
Following the precedent of Duro we have examined the question
of jurisdiction prior to the question of exhaustion of remedies.
In Duro the federal district court entertained a habeas petition
immediately after the tribal court had denied the petitioner’s mo-
tion to dismiss. No objection to the petition was made on the
ground that the petitioner had not exhausted his tribal remedies.
We infer that when a tribal court attempts to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over a person not a member of a tribe, no requirement
of exhaustion need be enforced. It is different when the peti-
tioner is a member of the tribe. Then, by virtue of her consent to
tribal membership, she is bound to follow the procedures of the
tribe if they are consistent with the Indian Civil Rights Act. Having
failed to do so, she is not entitled to have her petition for habeas
relief considered.114
Other than Oliphant and Duro, only three individuals have received a waiver of
the exhaustion requirement.115 In Greywater v. Joshua, the Eighth Circuit granted
the petitioner’s writ, noting that exhaustion was not required because the petitioner
was a non-member Indian.116 Greywater, however, was prior to the Duro-fix, which
restored recognition of tribal court criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians.117
Thus, a similar defendant today would be required to exhaust tribal remedies.
Similarly in In re Garvais, the court did not address the issue of exhaustion of tribal
remedies but proceeded straight to Garvais’s claim that he was not an Indian.118 The
court found that Garvais was not a member of a tribe or eligible for tribal enrollment.119
While enrollment in a federally recognized Tribe has never been
determinatively adjudicated to be an absolute requirement of
Act, but it was later dismissed. He was then charged by the Tribe, but due to the sentencing
limitations of ICRA, he was only charged with the illegal firing of a weapon. Id. at 679–81.
112 See Duro, 495 U.S. at 684–85; Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195–96.
113 See, e.g., Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 826 (9th Cir. 1995).
114 Id.
115 See Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1988); In re Garvais, 402 F. Supp. 2d
1219 (E.D. Wash. 2004); Connor v. Conklin, No. A4-04-50, 2004 WL 1242513 (D.N.D.
June 2, 2004).
116 846 F.2d at 493.
117 See Duro, 495 U.S. at 684.
118 402 F. Supp. 2d at 1220–23.
119 Id. at 1223.
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§ 1153 or tribal court jurisdiction, “enrollment is the common evi-
dentiary means of establishing Indian status.” The importance of
enrollment is evidenced by the fact that courts have found tribal
enrollment alone sufficient proof that a person is an Indian.120
The court granted his writ finding that he was only regarded as a descendant of an
Indian, which was insufficient to subject him to the jurisdiction of the tribal court.121
The final case, Connor v. Conklin, appears to be an anomaly with regard to the
exhaustion rule.122 Connor was a tribal member and his appeal was pending when he
filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Northern Division of North Dakota;123 thus, exhaus-
tion of tribal remedies should have been required, unless another of the previously
stated reasons were present. The respondent, the Tribe, however, did not raise the ex-
haustion requirement, and the court failed to address it.124 Nonetheless, Mr. Connor’s
writ was dismissed.125 This case illustrates the importance of tribal attorneys in rais-
ing the exhaustion requirement when representing an Indian Nation on a habeas
corpus petition. By failing to raise the issue, the court was able to proceed and ex-
ercise its jurisdiction under ICRA, rather than allowing the tribal court to provide
any needed remedy.
The federal courts’ failure to require tribal remedies when the defendants are
non-Indian stems from the concept of citizenship invoked by Oliphant.126 As Duthu
eloquently articulated:
The Oliphant opinion also introduced the concept of citizenship
and the accompanying language of individual rights of personal
liberty as a limiting principle on tribal powers. This functioned
much like the “protective cloak” of nationality that early colo-
nizers used to insulate themselves from the laws of indigenous
peoples. As the political theorist Steven Curry explains, “This
move was usually justified by the claim that settlers could not be
subjected to the ‘arbitrary’ and ‘primitive’ laws of ‘vengeance
and the blood feud’ practised by the original inhabitants as this
would be unjust. The nationality that clung like a protective cloak
to these settlers also brought with it the jurisdiction of their sov-
ereigns wherever they happened to settle. They denied to indig-
enous communities the integrative power and territorial authority
that they ascribed to their own communities so as to impose the
120 Id. at 1225 (citations omitted).
121 Id. at 1226.
122 No. A4-04-50, 2004 WL 1242513 (D.N.D. June 2, 2004).
123 Id. at *1.
124 Id. at *1–5.
125 Id. at *5.
126 N. BRUCE DUTHU, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 20 (Colin G. Calloway ed., 2008).
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extended power of their own states on the New Word, rather
than having that authority already present there imposed on them
(as they would have expected if they settled in a different Euro-
pean state.)”127
This cloak of citizenship is not a new concept in the United States.128 The privilege
of habeas corpus, if any, of enemy combatants and non-citizens has been vigorously
debated.129 When detainees in Guantanamo Bay and Bagram sought to challenge
their detention through habeas corpus, the U.S. government “initially took the posi-
tion that habeas corpus was not available to detainees because of their status as ‘enemy
combatants’ and their location outside of the sovereign territory of the United States.”130
The Supreme Court ruled that non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo Bay were entitled
to file habeas corpus petitions in federal court.131 When Congress responded with leg-
islation removing federal court jurisdiction to hear enemy combatants’ habeas corpus
petitions, the Supreme Court found it was unconstitutional.132
Although a thorough comparison of the cloak of citizenship is outside the scope
of this Paper, this view of citizenship is found again in the VAWA amendments to
ICRA that allow non-Indians to seek a stay of detention when filing a habeas petition.
Indians do not receive this same protection. The federal government perceives their
right to vote as enough protection against civil rights violations by tribal govern-
ments. Fearful of civil rights violations, the government affords non-Indians to use
their U.S. citizenship as a cloak and request a stay of detention while their federal
habeas petition is pending. Despite this differing treatment of non-Indians by the
federal courts and Congress, it is unlikely that tribal governments will treat defen-
dants in tribal courts differently. In my discussions with other tribal court judges about
if and how they will implement TLOA and VAWA, the response has been similar: they
will treat all defendants the same and will not set up separate systems with different
rights. As we will see with Mr. Haungooah, tribal justice is a respecter of persons.
C. Tribal Court Remedies Exhausted and Habeas Corpus Granted
The survey found only four cases where tribal remedies had been exhausted and
a federal court granted a writ of habeas corpus. Moreover, one of these cases has
127 Id. at 22–23 (citing STEVEN CURRY, INDIGENOUS SOVEREIGNTY AND THE DEMOCRATIC
PROJECT 77 (2004)).
128 See infra notes 129–32 and accompanying text.
129 See Edward F. Sherman, U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Bush Administration Position on
Guantanamo Detainees: The Watershed of the Boumediene v. Bush Line of Cases (Tulane Pub.
L. & Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 09-08, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=1407582; Stephen I. Vladeck, Deconstructing Hirota: Habeas Corpus,
Citizenship, and Article III, 95 GEO. L.J. 1497 (2007).
130 Farrell, supra note 74, at 75.
131 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
132 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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been discredited,133 one case should have been appealed by the Tribe,134 and a third
case is being appealed.135 The remaining case fails to support Congress’s concern that
tribal governments commit numerous civil rights violations or justify the need for
a stay of detention for non-Indians under VAWA.
Wounded Knee v. Andera is an older case from the 1970s where the tribal court
judge also acted as the prosecutor; thus, it is not surprising the federal court found
this to be a violation of due process.136 This was the most egregious due process vio-
lation found in the survey. Given the change and growth in tribal courts, this violation
is unlikely to occur today.137
In Spears v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, the petitioner challenged the
tribal court’s imposition of consecutive sentences as a violation of ICRA’s one-year
sentencing limitation.138 Spears pled guilty to six charges in tribal court: negligent
homicide, driving under the influence of alcohol, failing to take an alcohol test, failing
to stop at the scene of an accident, driving without a license, and a liquor violation.139
The sentences were imposed consecutively for a total of thirty months.140 ICRA states
that a tribe many not “impose for conviction of any 1 offense any penalty or punish-
ment greater than imprisonment for a term of 1 year or a fine of $5,000, or both.”141
Spears admitted that he violated several tribal code provisions, but that he committed
only one offense: unlawful driving, which resulted in the death of another person.142
The federal court held that the phrase “any one offense” in ICRA was ambiguous
and looked to Congressional intent to determine its meaning.143 The court noted that
133 See Spears v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (D. Minn.
2005); see also infra notes 138–47 and accompanying text.
134 See Johnson v. Tracy, No. CV-11-01979-PHX-DGC, 2012 WL 4478801 (D. Ariz.
Sept. 28, 2012).
135 See Kelsey v. Pope, No. 1:09-CV-1015, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43037 (W.D. Mich.
2014), appeal docketed, No. 14-1537 (6th Cir. Apr. 30, 2014).
136 Wounded Knee v. Andera, 416 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (D.S.D. 1976).
137 See NAT’L AM. INDIAN CT. JUDGES ASS’N, INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE: REPORT
OF THE NAICJA LONG RANGE PLANNING PROJECT (Orville N. Olney & David H. Getches
eds., 1978) (discussing studies of civil rights violations in federal courts). Getches’s seminal
report was the first on ICRA and found that tribal courts suffered from a lack of resources,
law-trained judges, and law-trained defense attorneys for defendants. Id. See also Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, Indian Courts and Fundamental Fairness: Indian Courts and the Future
Revisited, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 59 (2013) (revisiting Getches’s study and arguing that ICRA
is declining in importance as Indian tribes adopt constitutional guarantees similar to ICRA
into their governing structures to guarantee fundamental fairness).
138 363 F. Supp. 2d at 1177.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(B) (2012). ICRA has been subsequently
amended pursuant to TLOA to allow for three years when certain restrictions are followed
by the tribal court. Id. § 1302(a)(7)(C).
142 Spears, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 1177.
143 Id. at 1178–79.
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Congress intended to “adopt the concept that separate crimes arising from a single
criminal episode should normally be treated as a single offense for sentencing pur-
poses.”144 Once the court determined that ICRA authorized a maximum twelve month
sentence for a single criminal transaction, the court held that four of the offenses con-
stituted a single criminal transaction.145 The court granted Spears’s writ and remanded
the case to tribal court.146 As discussed below, this interpretation of ICRA’s phrase
“any one offense” has been discredited by other federal courts.147
A more recent case addressed the application of the new TLOA amendments to
ICRA. In Johnson v. Tracy, the petitioner was convicted of unlawful restraint, sex-
ual abuse, and assault.148 The petitioner was sentenced to 120 days of probation for
unlawful restraint, 365 days in jail for the sexual abuse, and 365 days in jail for the
assault, and the jail terms were ordered to run consecutively.149 The tribal appellate
court affirmed his conviction while the federal habeas corpus petition was pending.150
Johnson’s crimes occurred on June 12, 2010, and TLOA became effective on July 29,
2010.151 TLOA amended ICRA to allow for the imposition of three year sentences for
crimes when certain conditions are met by the tribal court.152 The TLOA amendments
also state that a tribal government cannot “impose on a person in a criminal proceed-
ing a total penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of 9 years.”153
Johnson raised several TLOA claims, including that the judge did not have the quali-
fications required by TLOA, despite the fact that none of the individual sentences were
longer than one year.154 The court concluded that the application of TLOA’s pro-
cedural protections did not present retroactivity or ex post facto concerns; thus, the
“[p]etitioner’s trial was a ‘criminal proceeding’ at which an Indian tribe ‘imposed a
total term of imprisonment of more than 1 year.’ Petitioner therefore should have
been accorded the procedural protections of 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) that were then in
144 Id. at 1180.
145 Id. at 1182.
146 Id.
147 See infra notes 148–56 and accompanying text.
148 No. CV-11-01979-PHX-DGC, 2012 WL 4478801, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 28, 2012).
149 Id. at *1.
150 Id. at *2.
151 Id.
152 Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c). TLOA imposed several procedural re-
quirements on tribal courts imposing sentences greater than one year, including the right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel that is at least equal to that guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.
The government must provide counsel for indigent defendants, and the counsel must be li-
censed in a jurisdiction that applies appropriate professional licensing standards and ensures
professional responsibility. The judge presiding over the proceeding must have sufficient legal
training and be licensed by any jurisdiction in the U.S. Prior to charging the defendant, the
tribe must make the criminal laws, rules of evidence, and rules of criminal procedure publicly
available. A record of the proceedings must be maintained. Id.
153 Id. § 1302(a)(7)(D).
154 Johnson, 2012 WL 4478801, at *2.
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effect as a result of the TLOA amendments to the ICRA.”155 The court granted
Johnson’s writ for habeas corpus.156 Unfortunately, the Tribe did not appeal and did
not challenge the court’s application and interpretation of TLOA. The Tribe had a
strong argument that the defendant’s cases were not prosecuted under the TLOA
amendments or that TLOA could not be applied retroactively. This again raises the
issue that tribal attorneys must ardently advocate for Indian Nations while defending
against habeas corpus petitions in federal court.
Currently, Kelsey v. Pope is under appeal, and it involves jurisdictional issues.157
In this case, Kelsey is a tribal member of the Little River Indian Band of Ottawa
Indians and was charged with assault in a tribally owned building that was located
off the Band’s Reservation.158 Kelsey was tried in tribal court over his objection and
was found guilty.159 He appealed to the Tribal Court of Appeals, which confirmed his
conviction and sentence of six months of incarceration and probation.160 Kelsey then
filed a writ in federal court arguing that the tribal courts did not have jurisdiction be-
cause the offense did not occur within Indian country.161 Although the Band argued
that it has jurisdiction over members, regardless of where the crime occurs,162 the
district court disagreed and granted the petition for habeas corpus.163
Of these cases where writs were granted after exhaustion of tribal remedies, only
Wounded Knee v. Andera involved a true civil rights violation.164 Numerous changes
and growth in tribal courts in the forty years since that case, including tribal consti-
tutional amendments that incorporate culture and separation of powers, training of
judges and tribal attorneys, and access to better funding, make it unlikely that similar
situations will occur. Also, the fact that no other cases similar to Wounded Knee
were found in the survey suggests that these types of civil rights violations are rare.
Spears has been discredited by other courts.165 Were Spears decided again, it is most
likely that the writ would not be granted. The issue in Kelsey is about jurisdiction, not
a true violation of the defendant’s civil rights.166 Finally, Johnson is one of the first
TLOA cases.167 And there may be others. The fact that there might be an increase
in the number of habeas petitions since the adoption of TLOA, and now VAWA,
155 Id. at *5 (citations omitted) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)).
156 Id.
157 No. 1:09-CV-1015, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43037 (W.D. Mich. 2014), appeal docketed,
No. 14-1537 (6th Cir. Apr. 30, 2014).
158 Id. at *2.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at *2–3.
162 Id. at *3.
163 Id. at *9.
164 See 416 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (D.S.D. 1976).
165 See supra notes 150–60 and accompanying text.
166 Kelsey, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43037, at *3.
167 Johnson v. Tracy, No. CV-11-01979-PHX-DGC, 2012 WL 4478801 (D. Ariz. Sept. 28,
2012).
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does not mean there is an increase in civil rights violations. Rather, it simply means
that disputes are over the interpretation and application of TLOA and VAWA. Like
Spears, Johnson may one day be discredited as an invalid interpretation of TLOA.
D. Tribal Court Remedies Exhausted and Habeas Corpus Denied
The survey of federal habeas corpus cases discovered six cases where tribal court
remedies had been exhausted and the writs were denied. These cases illustrate tribal
courts’ ability to address alleged violations of civil rights. The petitioners raised
various challenges: equal protection and due process,168 that the trial judge was
improperly in office,169 the failure to prove Indian status,170 right to counsel,171 the
right to confrontation,172 right to compulsory process,173 and right to a jury trial.174 All
of these challenges were examined by the courts and were denied. Cases of interest
include Bustamante v. Valenzuela175 and Miranda v. Anchondo.176 Like Spears, they
both raised challenges against the imposition of consecutive sentences as violations
of ICRA’s sentencing limitation of a one-year term of imprisonment for any one
offense.177 Both courts rejected the reasoning in Spears that “any one offense” is
ambiguous.178 In Miranda, the Ninth Circuit noted that the magistrate adopted the
reasoning in Spears, but the court rejected the district court’s ruling that the 910-day
sentence violated ICRA.179 The court examined whether the term “offense” had an
ordinary common meaning when ICRA was enacted in 1968.180 The court found:
[B]y the time Congress enacted the ICRA in 1968, “offense” as
used in the statute’s double jeopardy provision had an established
meaning—it meant a criminal violation with separate elements
of proof, not a single criminal transaction. There is no reason to
conclude that Congress meant something different when it used
the term in § 1302(7).181
168 Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005); Alvarez v. Tracey, No. CV-08-
02226-PHX-DGC, 2012 WL 1038746 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2012).
169 Anderson v. Henton, 399 F. App’x 280 (9th Cir. 2010).
170 Eagle v. Yerington Paiute Tribe, 603 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2010).
171 Alvarez, 2012 WL 1038746.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 715 F. Supp. 2d 960 (D. Ariz. 2010).
176 654 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2011).
177 See id. at 913; Bustamante, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 962.
178 Bustamante, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 965; see Miranda 654 F.3d at 913.
179 Miranda, 654 F.3d at 914, 918.
180 Id. at 916.
181 Id. at 917.
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The Court, rejecting Spears, held that “§ 1302(7)’s one-year sentencing cap for ‘any
one offense’ means that a tribal court may impose up to a one-year sentence for each
violation of a criminal law. As it is undisputed that Petitioner committed multiple
criminal violations, the district court erred in concluding that her 910-day sentence
violated § 1302(7).”182
E. Federal Habeas Petitions by State Detainees
A full comparative study of federal habeas petitions filed by tribal detainees and
state detainees is beyond the scope of this Article. Moreover, it is not an adequate com-
parison. Federal court review of a tribal detainee’s petition is granted without a tribe’s
consent to suit versus a review of a state detainee, where the state consented through
joining the United States.183 And, as noted above, the tribal remedy exhaustion require-
ment is not statutory, rather based on comity. A quick review, however, illustrates that
even if the federal habeas review was needed for tribal detainees, which the survey
demonstrates it is not, the actual process provides few remedies. Although Congress
envisioned providing tribal detainees with a remedy in federal courts that could not
be found in tribal courts,184 studies of state detainees who filed habeas petitions in
federal courts suggest that, in reality, state detainees receive few remedies.185 The
federal statute regulating habeas petitions from state court convictions requires ex-
haustion of remedies, rather than relying on federal courts to use comity.186 The re-
quirement of exhaustion of state remedies and the increase in the depth of state judicial
review due to past habeas litigation improving state procedures have resulted in many
petitioners’ sentences expiring prior to seeking a federal habeas review.187 “Most
182 Id.
183 See Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 148 (2002) [hereinafter Clinton, No Federal Supremacy Clause]; Robert
N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 841, 847 (1990);
Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 365, 365, 371
(1989); Philip S. Deloria & Nell Jessup Newton, The Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts
over Non-Member Indians: An Examination of the Basic Framework of Inherent Tribal
Sovereignty Before and After Duro v. Reina, 38 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 70, 70–71 (1991);
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45, 109–10 (2012); Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, Same-Sex Marriage, Indian Tribes, and the Constitution, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV.
53, 64 (2006); Frank Pommersheim, Democracy, Citizenship, and Indian Law Literacy:
Some Initial Thoughts, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 457, 461 (1997); Joseph William Singer,
Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 15 (1991); David Williams, Legitimation
and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, and Community in Federal Indian Law, 80
VA. L. REV. 403, 478–79 (1994).
184 See Clinton, No Federal Supremacy Clause, supra note 183, at 198.
185 See infra notes 189–92.
186 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006).
187 NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 73
(2011).
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state felons who are sentenced to incarceration after trial receive sentences of less than
six and a half years and will not have the opportunity to seek federal habeas review
if their state review proceedings drag on past the end of their custody.”188
King, after conducting her survey of habeas petitions filed by state detainees in
federal court, is not optimistic that habeas petitioners receive much, if any, relief in
federal court.189
For all but a very small proportion of the millions of those con-
victed of crime every year in the United States, the Great Writ is
a pipe dream. It is available only to those prisoners whose prison
sentences are so long that they are still in custody even after the
state courts have finished reviewing, and rejecting, their consti-
tutional claims. For everyone else, habeas provides no remedy
at all.190
King also found that those who eventually completed the long process of ob-
taining federal review actually received little relief.191
Of the thousands of randomly selected cases examined in the
2007 study, only seven habeas petitioners actually received any
relief from a district court. . . . As a percentage of all felony
cases prosecuted, the probability that a writ will be granted is truly
microscopic: less than two-thousandths of 1 percent (0.002 per-
cent) of felony cases started each year in state court will ultimately
result in habeas relief.192
Given that the federal process does not provide adequate remedies for state detain-
ees, it is doubtful that it will provide adequate remedies for tribal detainees. Although
federal courts have exercised their supervisory authority delegated by Congress
through ICRA, the survey indicates it is no longer necessary. It is more effective to
support tribal courts and their efforts to remedy civil rights violations through the
application of tribal law.
F. Implications from the Survey
The survey reveals several important implications. First, despite Congress’s
concern about civil rights violations within Indian Country, the survey reveals that
188 Id. at 74 (citing Sean Rosenmerkel et al., Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006—
Statistical Tables (Dec. 2009), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf [http://perma
.cc/ZWN5-T33Z]).
189 Id. at 74–75.
190 Id. at 75.
191 Id. at 81.
192 Id.
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there are few alleged violations in cases involving detention. Second, federal courts
have exhausted their supervisory review granted by ICRA, and it is not necessary,
as only four writs have been granted. Third, federal courts, through the tribal ex-
haustion requirement, recognize tribal sovereignty and that tribal courts are the
appropriate forum to address any alleged violations. Fourth, despite the lack of need
for federal review, courts continue to allow non-Indian citizens to wear their cloak
of citizenship within Indian Country. And now with the VAWA amendments to
ICRA, the cloak is strengthened, as non-Indians may seek a stay of detention while
pursuing a habeas corpus petition, which does not even require exhaustion of tribal
court remedies.193
Morever, federal courts, as discussed below, are unable to implement individual-
ized justice based on the tribal law of each tribal government that may come before
a federal court. As illustrated by the case study below, tribal appellate courts such
as the Navajo Nation Supreme Court implement individualized justice by protecting
civil rights as defined by their laws and culture, implement changes into the criminal
justice procedure when necessary to avoid further civil rights violations, and, as in
Mr. Haungooah’s case, do more than effect a release from detention. In that case, the
court used the restorative justice component of its tribal law to help Haungooah.
IV. INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE AND A CASE STUDY OF THE NAVAJO NATION
SUPREME COURT AND HABEAS CORPUS
A. Individualized Justice
The doctrine of individualized justice suggests that defendants at one or more
states of the criminal process should be “treat[ed] . . . as uniquely individual human
beings.”194 Most courts limit individualized justice to sentencing,195 although Beyea
notes that individualized justice is now moving forward into other parts of the criminal
justice process through the use of various defenses that reduce or negate culpability.196
Taslitz argued that criminal law requires defendants to be treated as unique be-
cause a court must consider the defendant’s mental state as highly relevant with regard
to proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime.197 In
193 See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127
Stat 54 (West 2013).
194 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); see Doriane Lambelet Coleman,
Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals’ Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 1093 (1996) (providing an overview of the evolution of individualized justice).
195 See Coleman, supra note 194, at 1114 & n.115.
196 Sam Beyea, Cultural Pluralism in Criminal Defense: An Inner Conflict of the Liberal
Paradigm, 12 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 705, 717 (2014).
197 Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice Through Psychological
Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1, 4 (1993).
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practice, however, the American criminal justice system fails to both provide individu-
alized justice and treat each defendant as unique.198
But what the law requires and what the defendant receives are
often two very different things. Overburdened criminal courts
behave more like bureaucracies than centers of justice. The pres-
sure to “move cases” leaves little time, and fewer resources, to treat
each defendant as unique. Add to these pressures the stereotypes,
myths, and presuppositions that we all bring to the courtroom
and the result is trial by assumption, not by a fair and thorough
evaluation of each defendant as a special human being.199
As discussed above, this is especially true with habeas petitions filed by state
detainees because of the volume of cases. A critical component of treating individu-
als as unique is to respect and protect their civil rights. Civil rights of tribal citizens
are better protected by tribal courts when tribal judges have an understanding of
such citizens’ civil rights, as defined by tribal law. Given that a federal court has no
understanding of civil rights as defined by tribal law, a federal judge is ill-equipped
to provide individualized justice.
The Honorable B. Michael Dann equates individualized justice with rehabilita-
tion and restoration, not necessarily tailoring the charging or sentencing of crimes
to the individual.200 Although he does not elaborate on his definition, he also realizes
the numerous obstacles to achieving individualized justice: too heavy caseloads
combined with speedy trial requirements, the lengthy time from arrest to disposition
despite the speedy trial rule, too little truth in pleas and sentences, too much ineffec-
tive imprisonment, and too much reliance on the criminal justice system.201 Judge
Dann argues that the lack of individualized justice in Maricopa County, Arizona, has
a serious impact.202
Lack of greater individualized justice sends the message to vic-
tims and defendants alike that they are not important enough to
justify the system’s resources. Many accused persons, who turn
to drugs or gangs in large part due to a lack of a feeling of self
esteem, end up in a criminal justice system that confirms those
negative views of self and feeds destructive impulses.203
198 Id.
199 Id. (citations omitted).
200 B. Michael Dann, Arizona’s Criminal Justice System, 29 ARIZ. ATT’Y 12, 14 (Oct. 1992).
201 Id. at 14–15.
202 Id. at 14.
203 Id.
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Fortunately, tribal courts can, and do, equate individualized justice with restora-
tion.204 The cases below illustrate that the Navajo Supreme Court, by employing Navajo
law, which is grounded in restorative principles, treats each detainee as a unique
individual. By using habeas corpus as a judicial tool, the Court interprets rights ac-
cording to Navajo law and imposes any needed remedy. Even while treating the
detainee as an individual, the Navajo Supreme Court uses habeas corpus to remedy
the system to ensure that others do not incur the same violation of rights.
B. The Navajo Nation Courts
The Bureau of Indian Affairs created the Navajo Court of Indian Affairs in 1892
which enforced prohibitions against cultural practices.205 Despite this new structure,
Navajo judges continued to use Navajo justice, which existed prior to contact with
the colonists.206 But many disputes were handled outside of the court system to avoid
the imposition of incarceration, which was contrary to Navajo traditional justice.207 The
Navajo Nation dismantled the Court of Indian Affairs in 1958 and replaced it with
its own court system, which after several reforms strengthening it as a separate and
independent branch, continues to function today.208 The Navajo courts use Navajo
Common Law, or their normative precepts, to guide their decision making.209 This
allows the courts to implement Navajo individualized justice, which focuses on re-
storing disputes and the community to right relations—hózhq’—or harmony.210 Former
Navajo Supreme Court Justice Austin explains hózhq’ as “a state (in the sense of
condition) where everything, tangible and intangible, is in its proper place and func-
tioning well with everything else, such that the condition produced can be described
as peace, harmony, and balance (for lack of better English terms).”211
Although this is a limited and simple understanding of a complex Navajo prin-
ciple, it is one of the main principles of Navajo Common Law which allows us to
204 Id.
205 See Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes From It”: Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV.
175, 177 (1994) [hereinafter Yazzie, Life Comes From It].
206 Id. at 177, 180.
207 Id. at 181.
208 See RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAW: A TRADI-
TION OF TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE (2009) (providing a complete description of the Navajo
court system).
209 See Yazzie, Life Comes From It, supra note 205; Robert Yazzie, “Hozho Nahasdlii”—We
are Now in Good Relations: Navajo Restorative Justice, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 117, 120–24
(1996) [hereinafter Yazzie, Hozho Nahasdlii]; see also James W. Zion, Civil Rights in Navajo
Common Law, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 523, 523–24, 531 (2002) (discussing civil rights under
Navajo Common Law).
210 AUSTIN, supra note 208, at 54.
211 Id.; see also Yazzie, Life Comes From It, supra note 205, at 175; Yazzie, Hozho
Nahasdlii, supra note 209, at 124.
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understand the application of Navajo individual justice via habeas corpus petitions.
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court not only examines petitioners’ claims of illegal
incarceration under Navajo statutory law and Navajo Common Law, but it also pro-
vides instruction, interpretation, and clarification to the Navajo Nation, lower courts,
police, and prosecutors on how to improve and reform the criminal justice process
to protect the rights of future defendants. Finally, the Court ensures that each petitioner
receives the assistance necessary to be restored to right relations. This case study
supports not only the tribal remedies exhaustion rule by federal courts but also that
the most effective forum for habeas corpus petitions lies with tribal courts which use
laws based upon their cultural values to implement individualized justice.
C. The Navajo Nation Habeas Corpus Process
Navajo Nation courts have habeas corpus procedures in place that are similar to
the American notion of habeas; however, the Navajo courts are not bound by American
law in their interpretation and application of Navajo law.212 The Navajo Nation
Supreme Court stated clearly that “[t]hough we have adopted [habeas corpus] from
Anglo-American law, we are, of course, not bound by outside practices.”213 Yet, the
Court uses habeas as a judicial tool to instruct the lower courts on the interpretation
and protection of civil rights according to Navajo law. The court has used it as a tool
to both instruct the lower courts and executive branch on, and clarify, the habeas
corpus process.
In Thompson v. Greyeyes,214 the Navajo Nation Supreme Court addressed the
uncertainty in the process used by habeas petitioners. The Court interpreted and clari-
fied the rules to ensure that petitioners, the jail, and the lower courts understood the
process and that the process was accessible to detainees.215
We previously have stated that Rule 26 of the Navajo Rules of
Civil Appellate Procedure (NRCAP) governs writs of habeas
corpus. Rule 26 primarily concerns writs against courts or offi-
cials to restrain actions taken outside their jurisdiction (prohibi-
tion) or to compel action required by law (mandamus). The rule
does not mention habeas corpus. Rule 26(d) states that petitions
for writs other than mandamus and prohibition “shall conform
so far as practicable, to the procedures [for those writs].” There
are several requirements in Rule 26 concerning service, payment
of filing fees, and the necessary facts to be included in a petition
212 H.M. v. Greyeyes, No. SC-CV-63-04, 8 Navajo Rptr. 572, 580 (Navajo 2004).
213 Id.
214 No. SC-CV-29-04, 8 Navajo Rptr. 476, 484 (Navajo 2004).
215 Id.
164 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 24:137
that are difficult, if not impossible for a petitioner to comply
with when the defendant is an incarcerated criminal defendant.
We therefore must decide what procedure petitioners should fol-
low that reflects a prisoner’s inability to access records, money for
filing fees, and other resources due to their incarceration.
Though located in rules that only apply to criminal cases, Rule 14
of the Appellate Rules provides a specific procedure for habeas
writs that takes into consideration the difficulties incarcerated de-
fendants may have in filing petitions. Based on our authority under
Rule 26(d), we hereby adopt the procedures found in Rule 14 of
the Appellate Rules for writs of habeas corpus involving incar-
cerated criminal defendants.
We now lay out the proper procedure for incarcerated criminal
defendant writs. A petitioner does not have to pay a filing fee, but
only needs to file the petition with the Supreme Court. The re-
spondent to a habeas corpus petition is not the court who ordered
the detention, but “the person having custody of the person.”
That person is the Director of the Department of Corrections
(Director). The Chief Justice reviews the petition, and may issue
the writ if “in proper form.” The writ of habeas corpus itself does
not order the release of the petitioner, but merely directs the Direc-
tor “to appear in the [Supreme Court] on a certain date and bring
the detained person with him [or her] and show cause why the
person should not be released.” In other words, the writ is the
equivalent of an order to show cause, and the Director must bring
the petitioner with her and respond to the petition by demonstrat-
ing that the petitioner is lawfully detained. The burden of proof
in a habeas case therefore shifts once the Chief Justice issues the
writ. The petitioner initially has the burden to establish facts show-
ing his illegal detention. Once shown, the petition is in “proper
form,” and when the Chief Justice issues the writ the Director
must show that the petitioner’s detention is legal.216
After clarifying the process, the Court moved on to the alleged civil rights vio-
lations.217 Thompson argued that he was wrongfully incarcerated because he was
sentenced to 120 days in jail for two offenses that did not authorize jail time.218 The
216 Id. at 484–85 (citations omitted).
217 Id. at 485.
218 Id.
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Court, interpreting and applying Navajo statutory law, determined that his sentence
was illegal because it was cruel and unusual under the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights.219
The offense of interfering in judicial proceedings did not provide for a jail sentence,
rather “nályééh, a peace or security bond, and/or a sentence of labor or community
service.”220 As a result, the Court found that the lower court lacked the authority to
incarcerate Thompson, and his sentence amounted “to legislating from the bench.”221
Not satisfied with solely finding that Thompson was sentenced improperly, the
Court explained Navajo due process and why he was sentenced illegally under
Navajo due process.222 “Fundamental notions of fairness in our Common Law
[Navajo traditional or oral law], articulated in our opinions as Navajo due process,
require that the respondent have notice of the available sentencing options before he
or she pleas to an offense.”223 In this case, Thompson’s reading of the criminal
complaint would lead him to believe he was charged with an offense that would not
lead to jail because the section he was charged with prohibits jail as punishment.224
Thus, he had no notice as to what sentence might be imposed.225 Thompson’s petition
was granted, and he was released.226
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court has applied its traditional law, which is termed
Navajo Common Law, to ensure the habeas process was tailored or individualized
for the needs of detained juveniles.227 In H.M. v. Greyeyes, H.M. faced consolidated
petitions for a child in need of supervision (CHINS) and delinquency cases in Crown-
point Family Court.228 The minor was placed in a youth home by the lower court.229
While in the youth home, the minor was moved to a youth detention facility for an
alleged violation of disorderly conduct.230 A petition for adjudication of a delinquent
child was filed, and, at a detention hearing, the lower court ordered continued deten-
tion.231 The minor filed her writ while the adjudicatory hearing was still pending.232
At the time of her filing, she had been detained for over two months.233 Her writ sought
release from detention and dismissal of the pending CHINS and delinquency cases.234
219 Id.
220 Id. at 485–86.
221 Id. at 486.
222 Id. at 487–88.
223 Id. at 487 (citations omitted).
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 487–88.
227 See H.M. v. Greyeyes, No. SC-CV-63-04, 8 Navajo Rptr. 572, 579–80 (Navajo 2004).
228 Id. at 577.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 577–78.
232 Id. at 578.
233 See id.
234 Id.
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The Court determined whether the procedures outlined in Thompson for habeas
petitions applied in juvenile cases.235 “To answer that question, as Rule 26 is not clear,
we look to Diyin Nohookáá’ Dine’é Bi Beehaz’áanii, or Navajo Common Law Princi-
ples on the status of children.”236 The Court noted that the importance of children in
Navajo society required that their rights be protected like the rights of adults.237
Under these principles we have held that the police, Social Ser-
vices, and the courts must strictly comply with the procedures in
the Children’s Code to take children into custody and keep them
detained pending disposition of juvenile cases. If agents of the
Navajo Nation fail to follow these requirements, we recognize,
at the very least, the same right of a juvenile to seek release from
illegal detention under a writ of habeas corpus.238
The Court, seeking to ensure the protected status of H.M. and any other chil-
dren, altered the rules established by Thompson for minors seeking release from
illegal detention.239
As we have previously recognized, the strict guidelines for de-
tention of children reflect that a child is not yet fully emotionally
mature. Children taken into custody “experience a gamut of emo-
tions from fear to embarrassment to anger.” Problems that may
result are violent confrontations with other children or staff of a
facility or infliction of mental or physical abuse on themselves.
Indeed, suicide may result from the conditions of detention. While
these reactions may also occur with adult prisoners, children are
especially susceptible to them. Therefore, we recognize that this
Court may release a child based on the petition itself, on the day
of the filing of the petition, without the necessity of the writ and
hearing required by Thompson. The Chief Justice, instead of is-
suing a writ, may, in her discretion, convene the Court immedi-
ately. The Court then may release the child without a hearing, as
long as all the justices agree and the reasons are plain in the re-
lease order. However, if all three Justices do not agree that the
child should be immediately released, the Chief Justice will issue
a writ and set a hearing, and the regular Thompson procedures
will apply.240
235 Id.
236 Id. at 579.
237 Id.
238 Id. (citations omitted).
239 Id.
240 Id. at 579–80 (citations omitted).
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The Court granted H.M.’s writ due to an untimely filing of the CHINS petition
and then proceeded to examine H.M.’s request to dismiss her pending cases.241
Although the Court noted again that it was not bound by the American definition of
habeas, which focuses solely on release from detention,242 it adopted a narrow inter-
pretation of relief due to the fact that writs cause interference with the lower courts’
management of cases.243 The Court denied her request to dismiss her pending cases.244
Despite the above ruling about dismissals, the Court made an exception in In re
L.R. v. Greyeyes,245 as required by Navajo individualized justice. The Court addressed
the minor’s request to vacate a conviction that arose from an untimely filing of a
juvenile petition for adjudication of a delinquent child.246 The Court ruled that the
juvenile was illegally detained when the petition was filed thirty-one days after the
referral in violation of the thirty day requirement in the Navajo Nation Children’s
Code.247 Regarding the minor’s request for a dismissal for two delinquency orders, the
Court stated:
Under the circumstances of this case, the Court will vacate a con-
viction where the statute clearly mandates a dismissal with preju-
dice if the petition alleging delinquency is untimely filed. This
Court will not send the matter back to the Family Court for dis-
missal. The burden will not be placed upon a child to petition the
court for dismissal or incur additional legal costs where the statute
mandates a specific remedy.248
By using the habeas process as a judicial tool, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court
has used Navajo Common Law to provide further instructions to the lower courts
on how minors should only be detained when the government is strictly complying with
Navajo law. In In re M.G. Greyeyes,249 the Court ruled that a family court cannot use
contempt to incarcerate a CHINS child when the Code did not allow such child to be
incarcerated under the original CHINS order. The Navajo Children’s Code
reflects the clear intent of the Navajo Nation Council that CHINS
children are a distinct group from juvenile delinquents and require
a different type of treatment. As defined by the Children’s Code,
241 Id. at 578, 580.
242 Id. at 580.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 No SC-CV-39-07, 2007 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 21, at *7 (Navajo Nov. 21, 2007).
246 Id. at *5–6.
247 Id. at *6–7.
248 Id. at *7.
249 No. SC-CV-09-07, 2007 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 1, at *2 (Navajo May 17, 2007).
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children in need of supervision have not committed a criminal
offense, but are in need or care or rehabilitation. . . . The use of
contempt to incarcerate a CHINS child improperly treats that child
as delinquent, violates the Council’s clear prohibition on incarcer-
ation of such children, and amounts to cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the Navajo Bill of Rights.250
Similar to Thompson, the Court again used Navajo Common Law to determine
whether a petitioner in a juvenile delinquency proceeding could be detained for an of-
fense that did not provide for incarceration of adults.251 The petitioner was adjudicated
as a delinquent child for a violation of disorderly conduct and sentenced to 180 days
of incarceration, which was suspended in lieu of 6 months of probation.252 Subse-
quently, the minor was found to be in violation of his probation, and the lower court
revoked his probation and reinstated his disposition of 180 days of detention.253
The Court holds that the Family Court cannot incarcerate a
juvenile if Title 17 does not authorize incarceration of an adult
committing the same offense. Though incarceration of a delin-
quent minor is mentioned as one option, the Court interprets Sec-
tion 1152(A)(2) consistent with Dine bi beenahaz’aanii [Navajo
fundamental law]. Under Dine bi beenahaz’ aanii [sic] children
must be treated with the greatest of respect. They are fragile and
the utmost care must be taken because of their continued growth.
Further, incarcerated children are not fully emotionally mature
and experience a “gamut of emotions” while in custody that can
lead to violent acts on themselves and others. Consequently, in-
carceration is a severe remedy for a child, and is to be imposed
only when absolutely necessary. To allow greater ability to im-
prison children than that allowed for adults is an outcome wholly
inconsistent with the above values. The. [sic] Court therefore
interprets Section 1152(A)(2) to only allow incarceration when
allowed for adults. Incarceration of a minor when unauthorized
for an adult is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Navajo Bill of Rights.254
250 Id. at 3–4 (citations omitted).
251 N.B. v. Greyeyes, No. SC-CV-03-08, 2008 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 2, *4 (Navajo Apr. 16,
2008).
252 Id. at *1.
253 Id. at *3–4.
254 Id. at *6–8 (citations omitted).
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D. Individualized Justice—A Balancing of Rights
Individualized justice in the tribal court setting requires application of tribal laws
based upon traditional tribal values;255 however, tribal courts are often faced with bal-
ancing notions of western or American rights that have been imposed through ICRA
with rights based upon cultural values.256 The Navajo Supreme Court faced this issue
when it determined whether a minor has a right to an attorney at a detention hearing.257
As discussed above, the detention of a minor is a serious matter guided by Navajo
Common Law.258 In M.C. v. Greyeyes, the Court found that the Navajo Nation Code
provided for a child’s right to assistance of counsel at all proceedings alleging de-
linquency.259 Navajo statutory law also required that a detention hearing be held within
twenty-four hours of the filing of the delinquency petition,260 which was not within
the discretion of the courts.261 As a result, when the minor requested an attorney at the
detention hearing, it was unclear whether the lower court had the discretion to con-
tinue the hearing.262 Navajo statutory law does afford the courts discretion to continue
a preliminary hearing, but that discretionary language was missing from the deten-
tion hearing’s statutory language.263 The Court stated:
The absence of similar language in the detention hearing section
leads this Court to conclude that the 24 hour timeline is intended
to be binding on the judge under all circumstances. In addition,
dine bi beenahazaanii [sic] [Navajo Common Law] supports our
holding.
Navajo common law considers the detention of a child a very im-
portant matter, stating that “incarceration is a severe remedy for
a child, and is to be imposed only when absolutely necessary.”
Children must be treated with respect because they are “fragile
255 See Christine Zuni, Strengthening What Remains, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17 (1997)
(discussing the use of traditional law); Christine Zuni Cruz, Tribal Law as Indigenous Social
Reality and Separate Consciousness [Re]Incorporating Customs and Traditions into Tribal
Law, 1 TRIBAL L.J. 1 (Jan. 2001) http://lawschool.unm.edu/tlj/tribal-law-journal/articles/vol
ume_1/zuni_cruz/index.php [http://perma.cc/4H2T-ESLL].
256  See MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 319–21 (2011) (dis-
cussing how tribal courts use traditional law); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Rethinking Customary
Law in Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 57, 57 (2007).
257 M.C. v. Greyeyes, No. SC-CV-16-12, 2012 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 9 (Navajo July 12, 2012).
258 See H.M. v. Greyeyes, No. SC-CV-63-04, 8 Navajo Rptr. 572, 579 (Navajo 2004).
259 M.C., 2012 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 9, at *10.
260 Id. at *7 (citing 9 N.C.C. § 1311(A) (2014)).
261 Id. at *10 (citing In re A.W., 6 Navajo Rptr. 38, 42 (Navajo 1999)).
262 Id. at *10–12.
263 Id. at *10–11.
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and the utmost care must be taken because of their continued
growth.” There is always a concern for a child who is subjected
to detention because they are not yet fully emotionally mature
and therefore they experience “a gamut of emotions” which can
lead to violent acts upon themselves or others. These principles
can be summed up as, biniinaanii holoogo ei alchini nizaadgoo
wota ‘ [sic]. Therefore, a determination of whether to release the
child should be made at the earliest time possible.264
In holding that the right to an attorney did not attach to the detention hearing in
order to ensure that the hearing was held within twenty-four hours, the Court noted
that the minor does not typically appear alone, but with a parent or guardian who is
allowed to speak for the child.265 Even if the minor was facing the court alone, he did
not face a determination of guilt at the detention hearing, and Navajo teachings pre-
pared him to speak for himself.266
In Navajo teachings, when a child reaches puberty, a boy becomes
a young man and a girl becomes a young women [sic]. Young
men and young women are able to speak to the court on the matter
offurther [sic] detention. In other words, young people can ex-
press to the court whether or not there is alternate placement
available. Although the ABBA [Álchini Bi Beehaz’áannii Act]
did not consider puberty in drafting the law, we find that Navajo
young men and women are capable of speaking for themselves
at a detention hearing.267
E. Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies
In its application of individualized justice, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court
continues to be respectful of the court process that, if allowed to work, can afford
justice. Similar to the exhaustion requirement in federal courts, the Navajo Nation
also requires petitioners to seek other remedies when necessary.268 In Begay v.
Tso,269 the petitioner’s requests contained within his writ were “more clearly consid-
ered as interlocutory appeals on the question of self-incrimination by the plaintiff
in a civil action,”270 and the Navajo Court of Appeals does “not honor interlocutory
264 Id. at *11–12 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
265 Id. at *12.
266 Id. at *12–13.
267 Id.
268 See infra note 275 and accompanying text.
269 No. A-CV-30-83, 1983 Navajo App. LEXIS 25 (Navajo Nov. 16, 1983).
270 Id. at *1.
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appeals.”271 In Begay, the court noted that the request before it was an appeal from
a district court order which was not final.272 Thus, the court denied the defendant’s
application for a writ of habeas corpus, his request for a stay of the lower proceed-
ings, and his other applications for writs.273 In In re Application of Johnson,274 the
Navajo Nation Supreme Court stated with finality that “[i]n no case should a habeas
corpus proceeding be used as a substitute for appeal.”275
F. Navajo Due Process
Similar to federal courts, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court uses habeas corpus
as a judicial tool to examine whether the lower court proceedings complied with due
process. The use of habeas in this manner allows the Court to dispense individual-
ized justice by ensuring the petitioner’s right to due process was respected. As the
Court did in Thompson, the Court ensures that the lower courts, police, and prosecu-
tors, understand and apply the Navajo definition of due process.276 The focus on
Navajo fairness of process ensures that each individual receives the appropriate jus-
tice. As the cases below demonstrate, the issue of due process often arises with regard
to notice and an opportunity to be heard.
In Johnny v. Greyeyes,277 the Court explained the Navajo meaning of procedural
due process. The petitioner alleged that his due process rights were violated after he
was detained for failure to appear before the Family Court on an order to show cause
and was not informed why he was detained.278 In addressing the petitioner’s due
process arguments, the Court stated:
The primary principle that informs this Court’s interpretation of
procedural due process is K’e Atcitty v. The District Courtfor
[sic] the Judicial District of Window Rock . . . . K’e, which fosters
fairness through mutual respect, requires that an individual is fully
271 Id. at *2.
272 Id. at *3.
273 Id. at *4–5.
274 No. A-CV-08-90, 1990 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 12, at *2 (Navajo June 14, 1990).
275 Id. at *2. 
276 Thompson v. Greyeyes, No. SC-CV-29-04, 8 Navajo Rptr. 476 (Navajo 2004).
277 No. SC-CV-52-08, 2009 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 1, at *6–7 (Navajo Feb. 27, 2009).
278 Id. at *4. Johnny was the subject of a Domestic Abuse Protection Order (DAPO) issued
on May 24, 2007. The order expired on November 4, 2007. The mother of Johnny’s children
filed a petition for an Order to Show Cause (OSC) alleging Johnny violated the DAPO. The
Family Court set a hearing date, but Johnny was not personally served. When Johnny did not
appear, the court issued a warrant for his arrest. Johnny was arrested on another matter and
served with the warrant. He was served with an Order for Temporary Commitment on the
DAPO and that Order stated good cause had been shown that he should be detained until a
hearing twenty days later. Id. at *1–2.
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informed and provided an opportunity to speak. The Family Court
therefore has an obligation to protect Petitioner’s right to due
process of law.279
The Court granted his writ, finding that the lower court violated his right to due
process “under the Navajo Bill of Rights as informed by the Navajo principle of
fundamental fairness,” because he did not have notice of the order to show cause or
an opportunity to be heard prior to being detained.280
Several habeas decisions have focused on the right to notice, a critical component
of due process. In Bitsie v. Greyeyes,281 the petitioner appeared for a pretrial hearing on
a criminal battery charge.282 After the pretrial hearing, the prosecutor charged him
verbally with a crime of interfering with judicial proceedings.283 The petitioner was
arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty, and bail was denied despite the prosecutor not
objecting to the petitioner’s release.284 The Court addressed whether the petitioner
suffered a violation of his due process rights because of the denial of bail without a
separate bail hearing and specific findings justifying his detention.285 The Court noted
that it was well-established that bail may be denied at arraignment and that this was
consistent with the Navajo Nation Code, which provides that every person arrested for
an alleged offense shall be given an opportunity to be released on bail within eighteen
hours from the time of commitment.286 Although the Court had previously held that
there is a legal presumption for pretrial release unless the government objects and the
court makes findings, on the record, of denial of bail in accordance with Navajo
law,287 the Court explained that when bail is denied, Navajo Nation Rule 15(d) requires
the reasons be stated for the record, but they need not be written.288 Reasons must be
given so that the “defendant understands why he or she will continue to be held pending
trial, and may contest those reasons,” and to assist the Supreme Court with review.289
In Bitsie’s case, the “[r]espondent [Navajo Nation Department of Justice] failed to
make any showing by clear and convincing evidence that clear and adequate reasons
were given to defendant in denying pretrial bail.”290 The respondent failed to produce
279 Id. at *6–7 (citations omitted).
280 Id. at *7.
281 No. SC-CV-55-11, 2011 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 7 (Navajo Dec. 19, 2011).
282 Id. at *1.
283 Id. at *2.
284 Id.
285 Id. at *3.
286 Id. at *4.
287 Id. at *7 (citing Wood v. Window Rock Dist. Court, No. SC-CV-20-09, 2009 Navajo
Sup. LEXIS 11, at *6 (Navajo July 1, 2009)).
288 Id. at *4 (citing Dawes v. Eriacho, No. SC-CV-09-08, 2008 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 3, at
*3 (Navajo May 5, 2008)).
289 Id. at *6.
290 Id. at *7–8.
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either a digital recording of the hearing or a transcript, and, without such record, the
Court could not determine whether the lower court adequately explained the reasons
for denial of bail.291 “An accused cannot be denied liberty for substantial periods of time
without well-established due process protections being followed.”292 Bitsie had no no-
tice of why he was detained or an opportunity to respond; thus, his right to due pro-
cess was violated.
The failure to make written findings of fact when bail was denied was challenged
again as a violation of due process in Apachito v. Navajo Nation.293 The Court noted
that the Navajo Rules of Criminal Procedure required the court to state their reasons
on the record, not in writing.294 Recognizing the importance of due process and the
right to notice, yet attempting to balance this with the demands on the court system,
the Court noted that requiring findings on the record was a recent change included
in a revision of the Rules prompted by
informalities violative of defendants’ rights to due process of
law . . . . The rule requiring findings on the record was moti-
vated by such concerns. Practical and sound policy reasons also
support our view. Every year more than 30,000 criminal cases
are filed in the trial courts throughout the Navajo Nation. It would
be impractical to require that in every instance where a bail denial
is considered, a trial court must state the reasons for bail denial
on the record and then undertake the tedious task of rushing to
reduce the same to writing.295
In Dawes v. Eriacho,296 the Court clarified the importance of stating clear reasons
for denial of bail on the record in providing notice to defendants:
[W]ritten reasons are not required, as long as the district court
judge clearly and adequately explains his or her reasons for deny-
ing release to the defendant, and such reasons are available in the
record of the case. The primary purpose of requiring reasons is
so that the defendant understands why he or she will continue to
be held pending trial, and may contest those reasons before the
district court, and, if necessary, before this Court in a habeas
corpus proceeding.297
291 Id. at *8–9.
292 Id. at *9.
293 No. SC-CV-34-02, 2003 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 15 (Navajo Aug. 13, 2003).
294 Id. at *6–7.
295 Id. at *5–6.
296 No. SC-CV-09-08, 2008 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 3 (Navajo May 5, 2008).
297 Id. at *7.
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Although the Court denied Dawes’s writ on the grounds that written findings
were not necessary, the Court, employing individualized justice, granted the writ on
the grounds that her later request for release on bail was not ruled upon by the lower
court.298 Dawes remained in jail for two weeks without a ruling on her request,
“without knowledge of why she remained there, and [with] no opportunity to contest
the district court’s reasons.”299 The Court held that the lower court’s failure to respond
was a denial of her request without any reasons, written or verbal, in contradiction to
Navajo law.300
The Court returned to the Navajo principles that limit incarceration and require
due process prior to imposing a sentence in Baker v. Greyeyes.301 Baker alleged his
detention was illegal because his sentences were supposed to run concurrently, not
consecutively.302 He argued that the sentencing court had not stated, in its written
order, whether the sentences were to run consecutively or concurrently, and the
lower court had failed to justify its incarceration of the defendant as required by
Navajo statutory law.303 The Court noted the Navajo Nation Criminal Code, which
requires that “[a]ll jail sentences must be supported by a written statement, by the
Court, of reasons for imposition of a jail sentence.”304 The Code also gives the courts
discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences,305 but due process requires
a defendant to have notice of possible sentencing options, such as a consecutive
sentence, prior to entering a plea.306 The Court granted his writ because he did not
have notice of the possibility of a consecutive sentence.307
Ruling that sentences are presumed to run concurrently, the Court, again using
habeas as a judicial tool to improve the system, provided this instruction to the
respondent, the Navajo Nation Department of Corrections:
Diné principles of hozhóogo and k’é additionally underscore the
necessity that sentences in criminal cases should reveal with fair
certainty the intent of the court to ensure that those charged with
executing an order of incarceration are not unduly confused. The
duty of a court to be clear pursuant to these principles are ex-
pressed in the traditional law that those in authority must re-
spectfully regulate with clarity, T’áadoo alk’ehólóní K’é bee
298 Id. at *9–10.
299 Id. at *10.
300 Id.
301 No. SC-CV-34-12, 2012 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 5 (Navajo Aug. 24, 2012).
302 Id. at *3.
303 Id. at *3–4.
304 Id. at *7 (citing 17 N.N.C. § 220(A)).
305 Id. at *9 (citing 17 N.N.C. § 225).
306 Id. at *9 (citing Navajo v. Morgan, No. SC-CR-02-05, 2005 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 11
(Navajo Nov. 8, 2005)).
307 Id. at *15–16.
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ííshjánígo. Respondent shall take heed of the presumption for
concurrent sentencing that has been hereby adopted, and note its
responsibility to see that defendants in similar situations are
timely released and not unlawfully detained.308
G. Mr. Haungooah’s Quest for Individualized Justice
Returning to Mr. Haungooah’s quest for individualized justice, Mr. Haungooah
was sentenced to 365 days in jail and a $500 fine.309 The jail sentence was sus-
pended and he was placed on probation for a year.310 A probation violation was filed
after three months, alleging that he had failed to be a law-abiding citizen, left the
Navajo Nation without approval, and possessed or used intoxicating liquors or con-
trolled substances without medical treatment.311 He was not served with the petition
or summons.312 He was arrested on a bench warrant issued a day after the petition
was issued, without having notice of the pending probation violation.313 At the hearing
without an attorney, he “admitted” the violations after a questionable process by the
judge.314 He informed the judge that he had left the area because he was homeless
and told his probation officer of his homelessness.315 The court imposed a 365-day
sentence, and after several motions to the sentencing court, Mr. Haungooah filed a
writ of habeas corpus with the Navajo Nation Supreme Court.316
The Court took up Mr. Haungooah’s request and, after examining the Navajo
Rules of Criminal Procedure, determined the summons must be served personally
or by certified mail.317 Under Navajo law, a bench warrant for arrest can only be issued
if the petition for a violation of probation shows probable cause to believe the pro-
bationer will not appear.318 The Court found there was no probable cause to issue the
bench warrant.319
Probable cause under Rule 53(b) requires, basically, a showing
of futility in getting defendant to respond, meaning either that
the defendant has disappeared with no way to contact him or her,
or that defendant has shown by egregious past conduct that he
308 Id. at *15.
309 Haungooah v. Greyeyes, No. SC-CV-06-13, 2013 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 2, at *1 (Navajo
June 4, 2013).
310 Id.
311 Id. at *1–2.
312 Id. at *2.
313 Id.
314 Id. at *4.
315 Id. at *3–4.
316 Id. at *4–6.
317 Id. at *7.
318 Id. at *7–8.
319 Id. at *9–10.
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or she will not appear in [the] future. Neither situation is present
in this case.320
The Court also found petitioner had not been properly served with the petition and
summons and, thus, did not have proper notice of the revocation proceedings.321
The Court also took issue with the lower court’s notification and waiver of the
defendant’s rights at the initial appearance and issued instruction on the proper
conduct of Navajo judges.322 The judge was “mandated to address the probationer
personally and determine that the probationer understands an enumerated list includ-
ing the nature of the alleged probation violations, his fundamental rights, and the
government’s burden of proof.”323 At a probation hearing, the probationer’s funda-
mental rights include his right to counsel at the revocation hearing, right to cross-
examination, and right to present witnesses on his behalf.324 The Court found the
lower court failed to discuss any of his rights and that the petitioner did not volun-
tarily waive his right to an attorney.325 A waiver of the fundamental right to an attor-
ney is protected under the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights, and any waiver must be a
“knowing, and intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circum-
stances and likely consequences.”326 The Court instructed the lower court that the
Navajo principle of “hazho’ógo” requires the Court to engage in a patient, respectful
discussion advising a person of his rights before a waiver will be found effective.327
The Court ruled that Mr. Haungooah’s waiver was not knowing and intelligent
because the lower court did not inform him of his rights enumerated under the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, including the right to counsel.328
The Court granted the Petitioner’s writ but did not stop with the violations noted
above. The Court, using individualized justice, turned to Navajo Common Law and fo-
cused on the restorative aspect of Navajo law.329 The Court noted that Mr. Haungooah
was a homeless, non-member Indian whose family had moved away from the area.330
It also took judicial notice that there were no alcohol abuse treatment centers in the
area.331 The Court reprimanded the failure of the tribal government in assisting Mr.
Haungooah with finding solutions to his problems of homelessness and addiction.332
320 Id. at *9.
321 Id. at *12–13.
322 Id. at *15.
323 Id. at *13–14.
324 Id. at *14.
325 Id. at *14–15.
326 Id. at *15–16 (citing Eriacho v. Ramah Dist. Court, No. SC-CV-61-04, 2005 Navajo
Sup. LEXIS 1 (Navajo Jan. 5, 2005)).
327 Id. at *16.
328 Id. at *16–17.
329 Id. at *10–13.
330 Id. at *10.
331 Id.
332 Id. at *10–12.
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Guided by Diné bi beenahaz’áanii which emphasized restorative
justice, the prosecution and PPS here had the discretion and re-
sponsibility to find a solution for Petitioner other than seek rein-
statement of his original jail sentence. Diné bi beenahaz’áanii
imposes a duty on our government to provide avenues for resto-
ration. Diné justice “throws no one away.” Diné bi beenahaz’áanii
gives our judicial system greater options and responsibilities than
strictly applying punishments. In any system, one does not place
unreasonable burdens on the defendant. In a restorative justice
system, a close eye should be kept on the defendant with an obliga-
tion to help defendants obtain services, even beyond the locality
if necessary. Such assistance gives a community hope by ensur-
ing rehabilitative services so that offending members can be treated
rather than merely punished or expelled. It is a fundamental right
of our people to expect that their governmental agencies pursue
restorative measures, especially where dire living circumstances
are beyond a defendant’s control, as in this case.333
H. Implications from the Navajo Nation Case Study
The case study demonstrates that the most effective forum to hear habeas peti-
tions filed by individuals detained by the Navajo tribal government is the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court. The Navajo Nation Supreme Court uses tribal law, written
and oral, to interpret Navajo statutory law, define Navajo civil rights, and improve
the Navajo justice system. Although the system began as a BIA court system, statutory
amendments have created a separate and independent judicial system focused on
protecting the rights of parties and dispensing individualized justice. The improve-
ments to the Navajo Nation’s habeas process, illustrated by the case study, made the
process more accessible to detainees and increased the protection of minors. The
Court interprets and applies Navajo law in a manner that federal courts could not.
A federal judge might be supplied with a Navajo code; however, a federal judge will
not have the knowledge or understanding of Navajo Common Law to interpret it or
its application to petitioners. Additionally, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court uses
habeas corpus in a manner similar to federal courts, respecting exhaustion of tribal
remedies and ensuring due process has been met, in addition to determining the
legality of the petitioner’s detention. Perhaps more important for each individual
petitioner, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court employs a version of individualized
justice which focuses on restorative justice, ensuring that no habeas petitioner will
be thrown away.
333 Id. at *10–12 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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CONCLUSION
Tribal courts are the most effective forums to remedy civil rights violations, and
ICRA needs to be amended to allow Indian Nations to opt out of federal habeas
corpus review. ICRA’s new amendment, affording a stay of detention for non-Indian
petitioners seeks to placate tribal court critics. The criticism, however, is not backed
by research. When Congress originally enacted ICRA, it recognized that tribal courts
are the proper forum for ICRA challenges, authorizing the writ of habeas corpus as
the only federal remedy. Federal courts have exercised that supervisory authority for
over forty-five years.334 In exercising such authority, federal courts have consistently
supported tribal sovereignty by requiring exhaustion of tribal remedies. But as the
survey demonstrates, the federal habeas corpus remedy, in addition to being a viola-
tion of tribal government sovereignty, is unnecessary. In the survey of the cases where
tribal remedies were exhausted, only four resulted in the granting of writs, one of
which has been discredited due to an incorrect interpretation of ICRA. Moreover, the
other three writs that were granted were based on jurisdictional issues, not civil rights
violations, because the defendants, with their cloaks of citizenship wrapped around
them, were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Indian Nations.
The Navajo Nation case study demonstrates that tribal courts are appropriate
forums. The use of tribal law based on tribal values results in individualized justice,
not simply individualized justice through the use of discretionary sentencing or miti-
gating a defendant’s culpability, but individualized justice through the interpretation
and protection of civil rights as defined by Navajo Common Law—something federal
courts cannot provide. Through the application of Navajo Common Law, alleged
violations are not only corrected, but the interpretation and application of tribal law
results in the use of habeas as a judicial tool to check the power of the executive
branch and lower courts. The Navajo Nation Supreme Court, using Navajo Common
Law, provides instruction on how to reform or change its justice system to prevent
any further civil rights violations. Perhaps more importantly to the individual, such
as Mr. Haungooah, the use of tribal law results in a form of individualized justice where
no one is thrown away.
One may question, if individualized justice is premised on the application of
tribal law based on cultural values, how a non-Indian, who may not have an in-depth
understanding of these values, will perceive that justice? And isn’t the application
of individualized justice based on tribal law an argument that non-Indians should
have a federal habeas corpus remedy and be allowed a stay of detention while the peti-
tion is pending because they have no understanding of the law? The debate regard-
ing the cloak of citizenship provided to non-Indians in Indian country, and the lack
of that cloak for enemy combatants detained by the U.S. governments will continue;
however, this is a debate of colonialism. Prior to colonization, most Indian Nations
334 See Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (1968).
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treated non-indigenous people with respect, regardless of their citizenship, and many
Indian Nations adopted non-citizens to afford them those benefits. Today, as illustrated
by the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, the Navajo Nation is a respecter of persons. Al-
though Mr. Haungooah was not Navajo, but a member of another Nation, the Court
applied Navajo Common Law to ensure that he received the individualized justice
he deserved. The Court did not care that he was not a citizen of the Navajo Nation.
Additionally, given King’s survey of habeas petitions by state detainees,335 many of
those petitioners would most likely welcome the opportunity to learn and receive the
individualized justice that a tribal court can apply.
Rather than focusing on increasing federal court review over the exercise of crim-
inal jurisdiction by tribal governments, focus should be on increasing the strength
of tribal courts to apply individualized justice. Many tribal courts already do this
through the application of tribal laws based on their tribal values, but more research
is needed to highlight their success. Other tribal courts are burdened with western-
ized laws based on Western values and are working to reform their systems, but they
struggle with a lack of resources. With an increased focus on using tribal court
forums, and limiting federal review, more petitioners will receive the justice sought
by Mr. Haungooah.
335 See KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 188.
